No big cases so far this week, but there are several opinions that provide practical tips to arbitration clause drafters and litigators.

The FAA Requires Marshal Service for Non-Resident Defendants

Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act sets out the procedure for confirming an arbitration award.  It also establishes the procedure for serving the application to confirm. “If the adverse party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in like manner as other process of the court,” 9 U.S.C. § 9.  Geostabilization International, Inc., (“Geo”) obtained an approximately $138,000 arbitration award in its favor against Pure Construction Services, LLC.  When Geo sought to confirm the award, it used a private process server to serve its application.  Pure moved to dismiss for failure to make proper service. In Geostabilization Int’l, LLC v. Pure Constr. Servs., LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19697 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2026), Judge Trauger quashes that service.  The parties agreed that Pure was a non-resident, which, the court holds, triggers the mandatory marshal service requirement.  However, Judge Trauger declines to dismiss the case outright, instead giving Geo another chance to properly serve Pure through the U.S. Marshals Service within 30 days; the court notes that, while the court must faithfully construe the statute, Pure did not show actual prejudice from the improper service. In an effort to conserve resources, Judge Trauger suggests the parties consider a waiver of service, instead of forcing the U.S. Marshals to effectuate service.

The takeaway? Do not assume that the FAA’s service requirements always mirror Federal Rule 4. Check the law in the applicable District to see whether marshal service is required – or better yet, request a waiver of service to save time and money for everyone involved.

Successor Institution Can Apply Original Arbitration Rules

In Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. v. Dynamic Industries International, LLC., 126 F 4^th 1073 (5^th Cir. 2025), the Court of Appeals considered whether the parties’ reference to the now-defunct Dubai International Financial Center London Court of International Arbitration (“DIFC-LCIA”) as an arbitral institution invalidated their arbitration clause.  Finding the venue provision to be severable, the Court remanded the matter to the District Court for further proceedings.  In Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. v. Dynamic Industries International, LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19714 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2026), Judge Guidry following that remand addresses what happens when the arbitral institution specified in a contract – here, the DIFC-LCIA – closes its doors.  He holds that the parties’ arbitration should proceed before the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DCIA”), a partial successor to the DIFC, but using the original DIFC-LCIA Rules the parties had chosen, rather than DIAC’s own rules. The court finds that this process reserves party autonomy while pragmatically addressing institutional unavailability. Baker Hughes had argued that only the LCIA could supervise the arbitration as contemplated by the DIFC-LCIA Rules, but Judge Guidry found this unpersuasive. He opines that the Fifth Circuit had already determined that DIAC’s rules were substantially similar to the DIFC-LCIA Rules and holds that he is bound by that finding. The  court stays the case pending arbitration.

The narrow issue of jurisdiction of these foreign institutions is only directly relevant to international arbitrators, but the lesson is broader.  Drafters should consider building fallback provisions into their arbitration agreements in case of  institutional changes.  While the major institutions in the U.S. – such as the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, and CPR – are unlikely to fold, there are more localized programs that might have a shorter lifespan.

Federal Common Law Provides Arbitrators with Judicial Immunity

In Lependorf v. Superior Court., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19180 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2026), a dissatisfied pro se plaintiff sued both the arbitrator of her divorce case and the New Jersey courts.  Plaintiff alleged that the arbitrator was biased and failed to comply with disclosure requirements under New Jersey court rules.  Judge Kirsch dismisses the action as to the arbitrator, holding that he has federal common law immunity, analogous to judicial immunity, and that such immunity exists independently of state law, citing UAW v. Greyhound Lines, Inc, 701 F. 2d 1181 (6^th Cir. 1983) and Cahn v. International Ladies Garment Union, 311 F. 2d 113 (3^rd Cir. 1962).

Plaintiff sought to distinguish those immunity precedents by arguing that the arbitrator here exceeded his authority and, therefore, that immunity does not apply. Citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the court construes an arbitrator’s “jurisdiction“ broadly for purposes of considering immunity and holds that the parties’ agreement gave this arbitrator authority to resolve the subject issues.[1]  Any alleged failures by the arbitrator to comply with certain rules – like filing disclosure forms on time – would not strip him of jurisdiction or the resulting immunity.  The court dismisses claims against the New Jersey judiciary defendants   on sovereign immunity grounds.

Arbitral immunity bars post-award litigation against the arbitrator personally. Lependorf reiterates the black letter law that parties dissatisfied with an arbitrator’s rulings face a steep climb, unless they follow statutory routes to vacatur. The limited grounds for setting aside an award under the FAA or state arbitration statutes remain the only avenue for challenging an arbitrator’s decisions or conduct during hearings.

Enjoy the next couple of days, as you gather the wings, chips, and beverages for the Super Bowl.

David A. Reif, FCIArb
Reif ADR
Dreif@reifadr.com

[1] The opinion does not quote the arbitration clause.  Counsel seeking to distinguish this case would do well to get the original record and see if the clause at issue here tracks the one which he or she is litigating.